

BRICUP Newsletter 106

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www.bricup.org.uk

bricup@bricup.org.uk

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Precedent set on International Definition of Antisemitism? Apparently not!

Peter Jones

In November, 2016, a report appeared in the online newsletter of Campaign Against Antisemitism) with the headline:

'Important precedent set as university regulator adopts International Definition of Antisemitism and orders £3,000 payout'.

https://antisemitism.uk/important-precedent-set-as-university-regulator-adopts-international-definition-of-antisemitism-and-orders-3000-payout/?mc_cid=788d64a4fb)

The story was about the outcome of a student complaint at Sheffield Hallam University. The report went on:

'The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (OIA) has condemned Sheffield Hallam University for failing to properly address a Jewish student's complaint about antisemitism, and has ordered the university to pay him compensation of £3,000'.

The student in question had complained about the content of social media posts by Sheffield Hallam University Palestine Society (PalSoc) about Israeli military action in Gaza and the West Bank. The student argued that these posts 'crossed the line into antisemitism and harassment'. After failing to get satisfaction on his complaint from Sheffield Hallam University, the student appealed to the OIA. The report continues:

'The OIA strongly criticised the university's handling of the complaint and found that the Palestine Society's activity did cause him distress

and inconvenience. The OIA cited the International Definition of Antisemitism which states that “using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g. claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterise Israel or Israelis” and “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” is antisemitic.... The recognition by the OIA of the International Definition of Antisemitism in accordance with calls by Campaign Against Antisemitism, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, and others sets an important precedent'.

However, while the details of the student's case and the OIA report itself are strictly confidential, other news reports have called into question the claims of antisemitic activity at Sheffield Hallam as well as the 'recognition' by the OIA of the International Definition of Antisemitism. Jewish News, of November 3rd 2016, for example (despite its headline: 'University to pay £3,000 for failure to tackle anti-Semitism') reports the OIA's response as follows:

“We have not reached a finding that aspects of PalSoc’s social media were anti-Semitic or that [the student] was racially or religiously harassed.” It added: “It is not for the OIA to determine the issues in the debate about where criticism of Israel crosses into anti-Semitism'.

<http://jewishnews.timesofisrael.com/topic/sheffield-hallam-university-universities-palestine-society/>

The Jewish News in fact makes it clear that the OIA had quite different grounds on which to support the student's claim, namely that 'the university “failed to properly turn its mind to the question of whether [he] had experienced harassment as a result of certain aspects of PalSoc’s social media activity”'.

It would appear, then, that the Campaign against antisemitism has misinformed its readers about important elements of the OIA report, in particular in implying that the OIA has 'called out' antisemitic activity at Sheffield Hallam University (and PalSoc) and has adopted the International Definition of Antisemitism. In fact, no 'precedent' about the use of this Definition has been set by the OIA.

Jonathan Rosenhead writes:

In my view 'International Definition of Antisemitism' needs scare marks round it, and for

more than one reason. Scare marks round 'International'. Scare marks round 'definition'

The history of the definition is that it started life in 2004 as the product of a working party of the European Union Monitoring Committee on Racism and Xenophobia. It was called a 'Working Definition' of Antisemitism because EUMC never adopted it, and indeed its successor body, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, has explicitly disowned it. It came into being in the first place because the EUMC working party was captured by a mixed group of US and European Zionists – the original text of the 'definition' has American spelling.

Various attempts have been made to get official status for the definition, and particular agencies in various countries have deployed it – for example it has recently come to light that the UK’s College of Policing has included it in their guidance to police forces for some time. However it got a new lease of life when in May 2016 a slightly revised version was adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. This is in fact not an international body, but an inter-governmental one set up for a specific purpose: in this case, to promote Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. This was another case of capture of an organisation to extend and distort its formal remit. No government has adopted the IHRA’s international definition – until the UK government did so in December. Another UK 'first'. No legislation is planned, but it will be circulated as guidance to public bodies.

But is it a 'definition'? It comes in two parts. First there are 47 words that purport to be a definition: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” But the words 'certain' and 'may' make it deeply imprecise. This text is then complemented by 11 illustrative examples of typical contemporary usage – 7 of which reference Israel – which 'could' be, or 'might' be antisemitic. There is a question as to how vague something can be and still be regarded as a definition.

For more detail see [BRICUP Newsletter 104](#) (November 2016)”

Counter-extremism agenda: safeguarding what?

Les Levidow

The Home Office programme for ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ has had mounting criticism and overt opposition (NUS, NUT, UCU, all 2015). In people’s experience, the term ‘extremist’ has been triggered by a wide range of indicators. A frequent target has been any Muslim who criticises particular aspects of UK foreign policy (Kundnani, 2009; Mohammed and Siddiqui, 2014).

Likewise Palestine has been a key indicator. In an incident widely publicised, a Muslim schoolboy was warned about the ‘terrorist-like’ views in BDS leaflets he had brought to school. His ‘Free Palestine’ badge was called ‘extremist’. He was told that his tutor had a legal duty to report such views to the police (Hooper, 2015).

At Lancaster University the students union President received a text message that police were photographing two posters in her office window. One said “Not for Shale”, the other: “End Israel’s attacks on Gaza”. When requesting an explanation, a union officer was told, ‘I was potentially committing a public order offence... I felt like the whole incident was an intimidation tactic’, the President told a journalist (Tickle, 2014).

In late 2016 a local authority announced:

"The Counter Terrorism Local Profile for York and North Yorkshire highlights the key risks to York as evidence of activity relating to Syria, presence of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), anti Israeli/pro-Palestinian activity, Hunt saboteurs, animal rights, anti-fracking and extreme right wing activity” (BBC, 2016)

As it further explained, ‘since 2010, local authorities monitor any activities where there is potential for community tension’, thus perhaps turning this into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Likewise an unintentional parody of the entire Prevent programme.

Driving the agenda

Despite the growing opposition to the Prevent programme, its surveillance and ‘deradicalisation’ practices are being expanded, supposedly to

safeguard vulnerable individuals. Why? What drives the agenda?

This question has remained marginal to the debate for versus against the programme. For example: The shadow home secretary Diane Abbott recently criticised the Prevent programme as follows: ‘The whole scheme is simply unworkable’ (cited in Travis, 2016). If only it were so... By unworkable, such critics mean unfair, e.g. by making families fear that their children will be taken away, frightening children, targeting entire Muslim communities, undermining potential cooperation against terrorism and therefore counter-productive.

Statistics about the programme’s operation have contrary interpretations. Amongst individuals reported for suspected extremism, 80% have no follow-up action by the police. This indicates a 5-fold over-reporting, according to critics. In response, the problem is inverted into a solution: those statistics demonstrate that the system screens out those who were wrongly identified and so works well, according to the Home Office (cited in Travis, 2016). Lost in such arguments is the enormous damage done (OSJI, 2016), e.g. inflicting child abuse, stigmatising individuals and generating distrust of professional staff.

Regardless of whether anyone is rightly identified as potential ‘extremists’, why are so many ‘wrongly’ identified? Namely, because the Prevent programme creates fear among professional staff, especially their managers, who expect a regular flow of reporting and referrals. These practices become a bureaucratic performance indicator, necessary to demonstrate that an institution is truly implementing the programme and so safeguarding those vulnerable to extremist influence. Potentially everyone becomes police or policed or both.

The programme’s operation depends on collective self-policing through fear of punishment, e.g. that inadequate compliance may jeopardise professional careers or an institution’s standing with its funders, especially through Ofsted inspections. Based on a vague definition of extremism, the reporting draw on and reinforce Islamophobic stereotypes. And the entire procedure generates fear -- that individuals may be reported for anything they say, that students may be disciplined for refusing ‘deradicalisation’, that people may be stigmatised, that parents may lose their children, etc. Given that many students feel intimidated, there is a danger that ‘people do not seek help when they are struggling with their

mental health (making them more unwell), or that those who do seek help are made vulnerable to surveillance and punishment' (NUS, 2015: 39).

Punishing 'non-violent extremism'

Such punishment has affinities with the entire counter-terror agenda. A decade ago the Prevent programme was established within the wider Contest programme to protect national security. This has sought to counter the ideology of 'violent extremism' and the grievances which make it attractive (Cabinet Office, 2008). In effect, this targets those who promote such grievances, i.e. threats to the state from political dissent.

From the start, Contest linked three crucial aspects: mass surveillance to identify an ambiguous 'extremism' which warrants various preventive and punitive measures. In 2009 this rationale was explained by the Home Office chief of Counter-Terrorism, Charles Farr: namely, the government has targeted a large group of non-violent people who 'create an environment in which terrorists can operate'. This criterion was later incorporated into the Prevent strategy and statutory duty (HM Government, 2015: para 77).

On this rationale of pre-empting violence, 'non-violent extremism' warrants not only surveillance but also deterrence and prevention. Anti-terror legislation encompass a broad range of executive powers, euphemistically called 'non-prosecution civil executive actions' (HM Government, 2009). Such punishments without due process include: withdrawing passports, imposing travel bans, even revoking citizenship – a step towards drone assassination in many cases (Woods and Ross, 2014).

With all its ambiguity, 'non-violent extremism' better describes the target of all anti-terror legislation since the Terrorism Act 2000. Given that violent acts and threats were already illegal, new laws stigmatised and even criminalised non-violent ones, as a basis to authorise punishments without trial. Such measures include: longer detention without trial, harassment for displaying symbols of banned organisations, long detentions at ports under Schedule 7, etc.

Under its own statutory duty, the Charities Commission likewise has been imposing punishments -- e.g. disqualifying individuals from being a charity officer, suspending an organisation's activities during long investigations -- in turn making organisations more vulnerable to denial or termination of bank

accounts. Interpal, which provides humanitarian aid in Palestine, twice found that its bank account was frozen while under investigation. Interpal was suspected of allowing its funds to reach 'terrorist' activities, presumably meaning Hamas. No evidence was found against Interpal, yet meanwhile the freeze undermined its operations and reputation.

There is worse to come. In May 2015 (and again May 2016) the government announced plans for a Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, which would strengthen executive powers to counter any 'extremist' views or behaviours, in the name of protecting vulnerable individuals or groups. There would be three new types of civil orders: Banning Orders (to ban extremist groups), Extremism Disruption Orders (to stop individuals engaging in extremist behaviour), and Closure Orders (to close down premises used to support extremism). Any breach would be a criminal offence; thus the CPS would not need to present evidence to the requisite standard for a criminal trial.

The draft Bill also proposed more executive measures: A new Extremism Trigger would guarantee that complaints about local extremism are fully reviewed by the police and local authorities. The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) will be expanded so that employers identify extremists and stop them working with vulnerable groups. The DBS will notify employers of any new information about extremism relevant to an employee, especially barring anyone with a criminal conviction or civil order for extremist activity.

All these punishment procedures lack due process or testable evidence, thus extending similar measures from all anti-terror legislation since 2000. In practice, suspect extremists are now treated as suspect terrorists. By targeting 'pre-criminality', special measures punish potential crime as if it were already crime. This political agenda has been hardly challenged amidst much criticism (e.g. JCHR, 2016).

In the updated Contest strategy, moreover, the government will counter online 'extremist ideology' by monitoring websites and removing 'propaganda'. It will set up alternative platforms to challenge extremism using a network of credible commentators and groups to maintain appropriate content. There will be robust intervention in all institutions -- schools, further education colleges, universities, hospitals, prisons

-- to root out extremism along the same lines as the Prevent strategy (HM Government, 2013).

All these measures intensify the close linkage between an ambiguously defined 'extremism', mass surveillance, executive powers and punishment without due process. Potentially everyone is drawn into monitoring and policing each other, e.g. by avoiding any discussions or events that might 'trigger' suspicion.

When Prime Minister Tony Blair was announcing new counter-terror legislation in 2005, an MP shouted out 'police state' -- true. A more accurate description would be: collective self-policing to impose routine punishment (or to avoid it), thus undermining citizens' mutual trust and democratic rights. This damage is no incidental by-product; rather, it is integral to the political agenda. Indeed, this explains why the Prevent programme will be strengthened, even complemented by more punishment powers, thus intensifying the fear regime.

The large-scale reporting on suspected 'extremists' generates its own evidence base, in turn justifying the programme. This circular logic is integral to the entire 'war on terror'. When journalists questioned whether President George W. Bush was always targeting real terrorist threats, his chief Karl Rove described journalists as living in 'the reality-based community'. By contrast, 'We're an empire now. And when we act, we create our own reality' (quoted in Suskind, 2004). With this self-fulfilling agenda, it becomes pointless to question whether counter-extremism measures are 'workable' or truly target extremists.

The UK strategy also has analogies with a wider shift in the neoliberal project towards routine punishment of vulnerable groups or even entire countries. When the Troika imposed heavy conditions to increase Greece's debt, supposedly to bring economic recovery, the Finance Minister denounced the Troika's demands as 'fiscal waterboarding'. During the UK's ConDem Coalition government, austerity measures likewise were meant to bring prosperity. And benefits sanctions were expanded to tens of thousands, officially to encourage their return to work, yet the sanctions often undermined any weak prospects that such people did have. Across all these policy areas, state representatives lack the will or capacity to justify how the punitive measures achieve their official aims, and they have given no substantial response to counter-evidence.

As William Davies (2016) argues, those punitive measures have 'a relentless form that acts in place of reasoned discourse, thus replacing the need for hegemonic consensus formation'. Empty affirmations of good intent are repeated ritualistically: 'power now seeks to circumvent the public sphere, in order to avoid the constraints of critical reason'.

Why? The state espouses different aims than its real agenda -- namely, punishing people or countries into submission -- which cannot be explicitly acknowledged or justified. The counter-extremism agenda conveniently undermines democratic rights, suppresses popular debate on UK foreign policy and diverts blame elsewhere. For truly preventing terrorism and safeguarding individuals, many critics ask for an alternative means. These have been attempted by many Muslim groups, but their efforts are undermined by the state's agenda.

For a counter-strategy, we should emphasise the following problem: An ambiguously defined 'extremism' serves the state's anti-democratic agenda of collective self-policing, mass surveillance, routine punishment and fear. All this complements a wider punishment regime of neoliberalism, lacking any defensible linkage between punishments, individuals' actions and societal benefits.

In the Prevent programme, the routine punishment (and threat thereof) will intensify until professional staff build greater self-confidence to defy the fear of punishment, to refuse their police role, to challenge its Islamophobic assumptions and thus make the programme unworkable. Since the government announced plans for making it statutory, opposition campaigns have raised slogans such as 'Educators, not informants', and 'Students, not suspects'. They aim to build support for individuals who refuse complicity and contest the procedures. This resistance needs safeguarding through visible, consistent solidarity. This effort can also contest the routine punishment which drives the entire 'counter-terror' regime.

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Notes: A somewhat different version was published on the Open Democracy website in January 2017. Both are based on a talk at 10 December 2016 IHRC conference, 'Islamophobia: [The Environment of Hate and the Police State](http://www.ihrc.org.uk/events/11774-islamophobia-conference-2016-the-environment-of-hate-and-the-police-state)', <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/events/11774-islamophobia-conference-2016-the-environment-of-hate-and-the-police-state> LL Counter-extremism BRICUP v170105, 05.01.2017 Les Levidow, Campaign Against Criminalising Communities (CAMPACC), www.campacc.org.uk

Israel lobby group threatens lawsuit if MLA endorses academic boycott

David Lloyd

Association passes the resolution to endorse the Palestinian call for a boycott of Israeli academic institutions. The [Brandeis Center](#) is a legal lobby group that represents its mission as being “to advance the civil and human rights of the Jewish people and to promote justice for all”, but lately it seems to have been devoting its time to suppressing legitimate efforts to achieve justice

and civil rights for the Palestinian people. The Center claims that the resolution is in violation of the MLA's charter and non-profit status. The threatened lawsuit would be frivolous and unlikely to pass muster, but the threat itself is hardly a surprise. On the contrary, it is an index of the growing success of the boycott movement in changing public understanding of Israel's ongoing violations of international law and human rights.

For some years now, opponents of the boycott resolutions have turned to coercive means—lawsuits, legislative acts, so-called “civility” policies to shut down free speech on campus, and the opportunistic attempt to define criticism of Israel or of Zionism as anti-Semitic—where they find it impossible to oppose BDS with rational arguments. This threatened lawsuit would simply be yet another proof that it is no longer possible to defend Israel's violations of international law in a manner consistent with liberal values. Indeed, it is increasingly impossible to defend Israel's ongoing dispossession of the Palestinians or the apartheid system it has established without also endorsing the racist foundations of the state. So Israel's advocates find it safer to silence than to debate. Coercion is not a very strong argument and will only repel people, as it has already done everywhere these methods have been tried, rather than deterring them. Those who threaten the exercise of free speech and the right to organize and educate on vital political issues. Those who threaten the exercise of free speech and the right to organize and educate on vital political issues violate the very essence of civil rights and the means that have historically been used to secure them.

The Brandeis Center's letter to the MLA, couched in language solicitous for the association's unity, is highly duplicitous. It claims that passage of such resolutions is divisive for associations: in fact, healthy debate on serious issues is always healthy for any association and the experience of the ASA is that the Association has more members and is in a better overall state since December 2013. A few embittered members of that Association decided to try to preempt the majority decision of the membership by initiating a similar lawsuit, but that only shows just how quickly Israel's advocates resort to coercion when they lose the argument in free and open debate.

The letter also claims that the resolution violates the MLA's founding principles. That is, at the

very least, open to debate. The [resolution](#) to endorse the Palestinian call for a boycott of Israeli academic institutions cites in its first clause the MLA's endorsement of the AAUP's commitment to upholding academic freedom. In our view, that means that the Association is committed by its stated principles to opposing violations of academic freedom wherever they occur, including in Palestine or Israel. On the other hand, the resolution, even under the strictest construal, does not violate anyone's academic freedom as that set of freedoms is [defined by the AAUP](#).

Given the robust protections given by the first amendment to the exercise of political speech, it is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit will ever succeed. Nonetheless, the threatening letter sent by the Brandeis Center is an act of bullying that is an interesting test of the MLA's resolve. We have been encouraged to unify and direct our collective efforts to opposing the likely attacks on education and the Humanities under a Trump administration. But if the MLA cannot find the will to resist a special interest lobby like the Brandeis Center, it is extremely unlikely to stand up to the bullying tactics that Donald Trump has made his signature style or to the cast of authoritarian diehards with which he is populating his administration.

In fact, a resolution that seeks to hold Israel accountable for its violations of Palestinian rights is all the more critical as Trump appoints openly Islamophobic, racist extremists to major positions in government. He has appointed an [ambassador to Israel](#) notorious for his extreme positions that include not only support for the illegal settlements, but also the view that Israel is entitled to annex the Palestinian West Bank.

The [conditions](#) under which our Palestinian colleagues and their students are forced to work are already utterly deplorable and Israel's violations of their academic freedom are routine and systematic. If the MLA proves too timid to endorse their call to impose non-violent sanctions on institutions that are directly complicit in the Israeli state's regime of dispossession and discrimination, what hope is there that we will stand up for the rights of vulnerable colleagues and communities here in the United States?

Notes David Lloyd is Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside, and a founding member of the US Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel.

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See more at

http://mondoweiss.net/2016/12/threatens-endorse-academic/?utm_source=Mondoweiss+List&utm_campaign=51cac645e9-RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b86bace129-51cac645e9-398525589&mc_cid=51cac645e9&mc_eid=3a92844578#sthash.H3qQLHnG.dpuf

The American Anthropological Association vote on boycott

Editor,

Below is a summary of an article by Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar “**Why Anthropologists Failed to Boycott Israeli Academic Institutions**” The full article is at

<http://savageminds.org/2017/01/04/why-anthropologists-failed-to-boycott-israeli-academic-institutions/>

Deeb and Winegar argue that the call to boycott Israel, led by Palestinian civil rights organizations, has had a number of impressive successes, notably in the American Anthropological Association (AAA) and the Modern Language Association (MLA). In their recent book, *Anthropology’s Politics: Disciplining the Middle East*, Deeb and Winegar examined the political and economic pressures that shape the attitudes of US-based scholars who have researched and taught about the Middle East since World War II - work that has involved struggles with sexism, racism, Islamophobia, and Zionism.

At the November 2015 AAA business meeting, 88% of over 1000 attendees voted to support boycott and place it on a ballot for the full membership to endorse. That ballot took place two months later when what had begun as an overwhelming victory, ended with a narrow 0.8%, 39 vote defeat for the boycott motion. Approximately one half of the Association’s 10,000 members who chose to vote were essentially split down the middle.

So what had happened? The obvious explanation was direct outside interference and there is **significant evidence** for this (see the full article for details). Pro-Israeli groups **filed a lawsuit** against the members of the Council of the American Studies Association which had endorsed the boycott in 2013 - an action timed to coincide with the early days of the AAA boycott vote and possibly designed to intimidate AAA voters. Other intimidation tactics included harassment campaigns that were designed to define any activity critical of Israel as anti-Semitism. Repeated harassing emails were sent to the especially vulnerable untenured scholars. Other academics urged anthropologists to vote against the boycott. Outside money mattered too, helping to set up anti-boycott groups of anthropologists.[2]

Applying pressure on academics to be silent about Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is not new. Since at least the 1970s, academics who research or teach topics against the grain of dominant U.S. narratives about Palestine have taken significant career risks. For decades scholars have been pressured to avoid public association with Palestine and this pressure was intensified as letters from university presidents and chancellors as well as other faculty members increased.

Many non-Middle East anthropologists were caught entirely off their guard by these tactics. Those whose work does not relate to the Middle East were exposed to these pressures for the first time; colleagues frequently expressed surprise that untenured faculty and students were scared to publicly support the boycott or feared reprisals if they did.

Deeb and Winegar argue that such pressures *are not the only reason* that the resolution did not pass in the full AAA membership vote. Many had over-estimated the degree to which the progressive perspectives of the business meeting represented the discipline as a whole. Although many anthropologists think that their discipline should champion the marginalized, some have colluded with colonial and state power.

Anthropology is the most resolutely international of the social sciences yet anthropologists based in the U.S. mainly cite work from U.S. institutions. Anthropologists frequently identify as politically

left-leaning and are critical of capitalism, yet they continue to work in increasingly corporatized university environments. The authors conclude that the full membership vote can best be explained by a combination of the pressures exerted by external, often Israeli-led, organized opposition to the boycott *and* to the lingering mythology that anthropological scholarship, and by extension, anthropologists and their scholarly associations like the AAA, can and should be “objective” and apolitical. It is only when violations of Palestinian rights are the issue that Israeli counter arguments are so vehemently deployed.

The authors conclude that the vote outcome was due to *both* external interference and pressure *and* longstanding dynamics within anthropology and the academy. This combination of dynamics explains why dozens of boycott supporters signed the boycott pledge **anonymously** and avoided publicly advocating for boycott in their departments and with colleagues. It also explains why the panels of anthropologists opposed to the boycott were made up disproportionately of older white male speakers, compared with the striking diversity of speakers supporting the boycott.

The very close vote can be seen as either an absolute loss or as a victory that illustrates how far the movement for Palestinian rights has come in the past decade. Younger anthropologists are challenging the kinds of liberal politics of an older anthropology that often rests implicitly on subtle forms of racism and paternalism. The participants in the vote were the most diverse gathering of anthropologists ever seen. Israel-Palestine is this generation’s apartheid South Africa: it was also a relatively young gathering. The electronic ballot for the full membership vote was open for a month and a half, and members could vote from home. It is therefore possible to read the difference in the two outcomes as diagnostic of the demographic shifts in anthropology and as a return of earlier moments of heightened political consciousness in the discipline. Currently, older, whiter, male, Zionist, liberal scholars still outnumber those who dominated the business meeting.

The other half of the answer lies in the extraordinary efforts made by anti-boycott organizations to defeat the resolution in the full AAA membership vote. The business meeting

was seen as a challenge to those who fear the boycott, including Israeli government officials. The extent of their attention to the academic boycott actually highlights the success of the boycott movement in raising critical awareness about Palestinian rights and Israeli violations among an ever-growing number of U.S. scholars. Perhaps we should understand that the narrow loss of the AAA vote was not quite a loss at all.

Notes

[1] These include the Asian-American Studies Association, the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association, the Critical Ethnic Studies Association, the National Association of Chicana and Chicano Studies, the African Literature Association, the Peace and Justice Studies Association, and the Association for Humanist Sociology, and the American Studies Association.

[2] See Anthroboycott’s synopsis of the entire opposition playbook **here**.

This article was published by Savage Minds on **January 4, 2017** **Carole McGranahan** *Lara Deeb* is Professor of Anthropology at Scripps College. *Jessica Winegar* is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Northwestern University. Together, they are co-authors of *Anthropology’s Politics: Disciplining the Middle East* (Stanford University Press, 2015).

Notices

BRICUP is the **British Committee for the Universities of Palestine**.

We are always willing to help provide speakers for meetings. All such requests and any comments or suggestions concerning this Newsletter are welcome.

Email them to: newsletter@bricup.org.uk

Register as a supporter of BRICUP

You can register as a supporter of BRICUP and of the academic and cultural boycott of Israel [by completing this form](#).

We recognise that many individuals may wish to support our aims by private actions without

wishing to be publicly identified. Supporters receive our regular newsletter by email and receive occasional emails giving details of urgent developments and of ways to support our activities. We do not disclose the names of our supporters to anyone outside BRICUP or share them with any other organisation.

Financial support for BRICUP

We welcome one-off donations, but we can plan our work much better if people pledge regular payments by standing order.

You can [download a standing order form](#) here.

One-off donations may be made by sending a cheque to the Treasurer, at BRICUP, BM BRICUP, London, WC1N 3XX, UK or by making a bank transfer to BRICUP at

Sort Code 08-92-99

Account Number 65156591

IBAN = GB20 CPBK 0892 9965 1565 91

BIC = CPBK GB22

If you use the direct funds transfer mechanism, please confirm the transaction by sending an explanatory email to treasurer@bricup.org.uk